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The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986: Faulty
Drafting May Defeat Efforts to
Bring Terrorists to Justice
To combat the dramatic rise in foreign terrorist attacks against U.S.
targets, 1 Congress recently enacted legislation intended to enhance the
security of U.S. diplomats and civilians residing or travelling abroad.
2
Title XII of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
19863 establishes U.S. criminal jurisdiction over extraterritorial terror-
ist 4 assaults5 against U.S. nationals.6 The Act asserts extraterritorial
1. Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania recently introduced a bill in which he esti-
mates that 6,500 terrorist incidents have occurred worldwide in the past decade, of
which 2,500 (38%) have been directed against Americans. S. Res. 190, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 8999 (1985).
2. On August 27, 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Omnibus Diplo-
matic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 853 [hereinafter Antiterrorism Act]. Of the Act's
thirteen tides, this Note focuses on Title XII, which creates a mechanism for the
criminal punishment of international terrorists. The other titles implement diverse
antiterrorist measures. For example, Tides I through IV of the Antiterrorism Act
establish a Diplomatic Security Program for the protection of U.S. missions abroad.
Title V authorizes the payment of awards for information leading to the arrest of
international terrorists. Title VI contains measures for the prevention of nuclear ter-
rorism. Title IX improves the security of maritime activity against terrorist attack.
3. Title XII of the Antiterrorism Act, id. at 895, consists of two sections. Section
1201 of Title XII expresses the sense of Congress that the President should
encourage the establishment of an international agreement on all aspects of interna-
tional terrorism. The substance of Title XII, however, appears in section 1202. That
section amends Title 18 of the U.S. Code by adding chapter 1 13A, "EXTRATERRITO-
RIAL JURISDICTION OVER TERRORIST ACTS ABROAD AGAINST UNITED STATES NATION-
ALS." See id. at 896. The codification of section 1202 may be found at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2331 (West Supp. 1987). (Hereinafter Title XII.)
4. Title XII limits prosecution to terrorist attacks by requiring Attorney General
certification that the "offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against
a government or a civilian population." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(e) (West Supp. 1987).
An earlier version of the Antiterrorism Act incorporated an existing statutory defini-
tion of terrorism. S. 1429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1985). That definition
describes international terrorism as an act in violation of the criminal laws of any
nation which appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to
influence the policy of a government, or to affect the conduct of a government, and
which transcends national boundaries. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(c) (West Supp. 1987).
The definition of "terrorism" is a subject of international debate and is beyond the
scope of this Note. See, e.g., Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON
L. REV. 380 (1973).
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authority solely on the basis of the victim's nationality, a theory ofjuris-
diction termed the passive personality principle.
The Antiterrorism Act's reliance on the passive personality princi-
ple as its sole basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction will hinder, if not pre-
vent, the extradition of terrorists under Title XII. A number of civil law
countries recognize the passive personality principle as a legitimate the-
ory of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 7 The principle has also been incor-
porated into multilateral conventions dealing with terrorism.8
Nevertheless, the validity and acceptance of the passive personality the-
ory remains uncertain under international law. This Note argues, there-
fore, that the Antiterrorism Act will not accomplish its goal of enhancing
the safety of U.S. citizens abroad because extradition hinges on a ques-
tionable theory of jurisdiction.
Congress, when enacting this statute, apparently failed to consider
the implications of limiting jurisdictional authority to the passive per-
sonality principle. This Note proposes that Congress amend the
Antiterrorism Act to incorporate other theories of extraterritorial juris-
diction, thereby strengthening the ability of the United States to obtain
jurisdiction to prosecute terrorists in U.S. courts.
This Note focuses on the jurisdictional and extradition aspects of
the Antiterrorism Act. Section I generally surveys international extradi-
tion law, and then examines specific multilateral arrangements provid-
ing for terrorist extradition and prosecution. Section II surveys the
theories of jurisdiction available to states in proscribing extraterritorial
terrorist acts, including the passive personality principle. Section III
then analyzes the obstacles to effective enforcement of the Antiterrorism
Act in light of international extradition law and practice. Finally, Sec-
tion IV proposes improvements to the Act's claim of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
I. Extradition Treaties and International Practice
Because Title XII of the Antiterrorism Act proscribes certain conduct
occurring outside territorial borders, the United States will obtain juris-
diction over alleged terrorists primarily by extradition.9 Title XII's
5. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2331 (a)-(c) (West Supp. 1987) prohibits actual and attempted
terrorist murder, manslaughter, violent assault, and conspiracy to commit homicide.
6. The term "U.S. national" includes not only U.S. citizens but also non-citizens
who owe "permanent allegiance" to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22)
(1982).
7. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Tokyo Convention, infra note 35, art. 4(b); New York Convention,
infra note 36, art. 3, § 1(c); Hostages Convention, infra note 37, art. 5, § 1(d).
9. Where a formal extradition request is impractical or inappropriate, however,
the United States will consider the forceful abduction of alleged offenders. 132
CONG. REC. S8438 (daily ed. June 25, 1986) (statement of Sen. Specter). The U.S.
military's recent interception of the Egyptian airliner carrying the hijackers of the
Achille Lauro cruise ship in October, 1985, illustrates this approach. See N.Y. Times,
Oct. 11, 1986, at Al, col. 6. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that forcibly abduct-
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effectiveness thus hinges on how successfully it can be used to obtain
extradition. This section first discusses the framework and general prin-
ciples of international extradition, and then examines specific multilat-
eral extradition treaties.
A. Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Conventions
Under U.S. law, extradition is the "process by which, in accordance to
[sic] treaty provisions and subject to its limitations one state requests
another to surrender a person charged with a criminal violation of the
laws of the requesting state who is within the jurisdiction of the
requested state, for the purposes of answering criminal charges .... " 10
Although no general extradition duty exists under international law,
states may create between themselves a binding obligation to extradite
by entering into "contractual," or reciprocal arrangements." While
some civil law countries rely on principles of international comity or
unwritten reciprocal arrangements for extradition,' 2 common law coun-
tries generally will not extradite in the absence of a written instru-
ment.1 3 Extradition instruments may take one of three primary forms:
bilateral extradition treaties, multilateral extradition treaties, or multi-
lateral conventions which contain provisions for extradition.'
4
Bilateral treaties are the most important source of extradition law;
the United States, for example, is a party to over 100 such treaties. 15
Each treaty contains both provisions for surrendering alleged or actual
offenders and a procedure by which the requested state can deny extra-
ing U.S. citizens or foreign nationals abroad is not inconsistent with the constitu-
tional guarantee of due process. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Kerr v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Although forceful abduction eliminates the need to act
under an accepted basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it remains an extraordinary
means of obtaining personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Note assumes the United
States will primarily use formal extradition methods to obtain authority over ter-
rorists and to submit them to prosecution.
10. M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 27
(1974).
11. I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1971). "Extradition trea-
ties and legislation not only supply the broad principles and the detailed rules of
extradition but also dictate the very existence of the obligation to surrender fugitive
criminals." Id. at 22.
12. These civil law countries will ordinarily have only a small number of extradi-
tion treaties, either with states which will not extradite without a treaty, or where for
reasons of territorial contiguity or commercial ties, a formal treaty is especially desir-
able. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 10, at 9.
13. Id. at 8.
14. States also may obtain personal jurisdiction over alleged offenders by a vari-
ety of legal and illegal means. Legal means include exclusion and deportation, in
contrast to illegal seizure or abduction. See J. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISTS 81-94 (1985). By excluding or deporting an alleged terrorist, a state may
deny that person the privilege of remaining in the state, and may place him in the
control of another state which seeks jurisdiction. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, I INTERNA-
TIONAL EXTRADITION: U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE ch. IV, at § 1-1 (1982). For a brief
discussion of abduction, see supra note 9.
15. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at ch. I, § 5-I.
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dition. Because each bilateral treaty constitutes an exclusive, independ-
ent source of rights and obligations which binds the parties, different
countries' extradition requests based on identical crimes may produce
inconsistent results. In short, the grant or denial of extradition will
depend upon the terms of the relevant treaty.' 6
Multilateral extradition treaties function identically to bilateral trea-
ties but provide a legal basis for extradition among multiple state par-
ties. 17 Multilateral arrangements promote certainty in extradition
practice by reducing inconsistencies among various bilateral treaties and
their implementing legislation.' 8 In international practice, however,
signatories rarely invoke the multilateral treaties dealing exclusively with
extradition. 19
More effective are those multilateral conventions which prohibit
certain forms of terrorism and contain provisions for terrorist extradi-
tion. These counter-terrorist conventions contain flexible extradition
arrangements; signatories may either employ the convention instrument
as a legal basis for requesting extradition, or may use bilateral extradi-
tion treaties to extradite offenders for the specific crimes proscribed by
the convention. The counter-terrorist conventions signify a realization
by the world community of the need to create a cooperative interna-
tional mechanism for the extradition and prosecution of terrorists. Fur-
ther, the conventions indicate the difficulty of extraditing terrorists
within the existing framework of bilateral extradition treaties. 20
B. Substantive Requirements of Extradition Treaties
Comprehensive assessment of the Antiterrorism Act's utility for terrorist
extradition would require analyzing the one hundred plus extradition
treaties in force in the United States. The similarities among these trea-
16. In addition to the extradition treaty's specific provisions, other factors may
also affect a state's extradition decision, including the nature of the offense, the pre-
rogative, if it exists, to flexibly interpret treaty requirements, the result of the
requested state's previous extradition requests to the United States, foreign policy
matters, and political relations between the two countries. For a discussion of the
policy issues involved in extradition decisions, see generally id. at ch. X.
17. Id. at ch. II, § 3-6.
18. Id. at ch. I, § 4-1. In the United States, extradition treaties are deemed self-
executing unless they provide otherwise, and therefore require no implementing leg-
islation. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1901). But, courts will generally
interpret subsequently enacted federal legislation as controlling over conflicting
treaty provisions. M.C. BAssIouNI, supra note 14, at ch. II, § 4-7.
While the Antiterrorism Act extends U.S. jurisdiction over extraterritorial terrorist
assaults, it leaves unchanged the federal extradition statutes, codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3181-95 (1982).
19. In contrast to the large number of bilateral extradition treaties to which the
United States is a party, it belongs to only one multilateral extradition treaty, a
regional accord. Montevideo Convention on Extradition, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3111, T.S. No. 882, 165 L.N.T.S. 45. Moreover, when requesting extradition from
member states, the United States prefers using bilateral treaties. See M.C. BAssIoUNI,
supra note 14, at ch. II, §§ 3-1, 3-2.
20. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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ties, however, provide sufficient background for discussing Title XII's
potential problems. This discussion will focus on three of the most
important substantive requirements incorporated into all extradition
treaties and multilateral conventions: (1) extraditability of the offense;
(2) double criminality; and (3) reciprocity. 21
Offenses are extraditable if the parties so deem them. Two
approaches to establishing extraditability are most common. A treaty
may specifically list extraditable offenses, or it may designate a formula,
such as a minimum penalty enforceable in both states, to determine
extraditability.2 2 For example, the Italy-United States extradition treaty
provides that an offense is extraditable "if it is punishable under the laws
of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of
more than one year or by a more severe penalty."'23
The concept of double criminality requires the alleged conduct to
be an offense in both the requesting and requested states before the
requested state will grant extradition. 24 A variation of the double crimi-
nality requirement extends to jurisdictional authority. This "special
use" of double criminality provides that not only must the conduct con-
stitute an offense in both states, "but also that the theory ofjurisdiction
over the conduct asserted by the requesting state be accepted as proper
by the requested state."' 25 Thus, if the illegal conduct for which extradi-
tion is requested (e.g., terrorist assault) constitutes a crime in the
requested state, but the theory ofjurisdiction asserted (e.g., the passive
personality principle) is not recognized by that state, extradition will fail
if the treaty requires application of the "special use" of the double crimi-
nality requirement. 26
Reciprocity refers to "the mutuality of obligations and undertakings
of the parties" to the extradition agreement.2 7 A state may insist on
reciprocity as a prerequisite to extradition as a matter of sovereign pre-
rogative, 28 and may apply reciprocity to any aspect of the extradition
21. Specialty and non-inquiry are also substantive requirements. The specialty
principle dictates that "a fugitive may not be tried in the requesting State for an
offence other than the one for which surrender was made .... I. SHEARER, supra
note 11, at 146. The non-inquiry doctrine precludes inquiry into the requesting
state's legal processes. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at ch. VII, § 2-1.
22. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at ch. VII, § 4-1.
23. Extradition Treaty Between the United States and Italy, Oct. 13, 1983, art. II,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1525
(1985).
24. I. SHEARER, supra note 11, at 137.
25. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over Extraterrito-
rial Crimes, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 685, 744.
26. The frequency with which the "special use" requirement of double criminality
applies to extradition requests is beyond the scope of this Note. Blakesley states that
denial on this basis is "standard" in international and U.S. practice. Id. at 747. Blake-
sley's cited sources for this proposition, however, date from 1873 and 1906.
27. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at ch. VII, § 2-1. Absent a treaty, the principle
of reciprocity may provide the legal basis for extradition.
28. Id. § 2-4. Many recent U.S. extradition treaties dispense with reciprocity in
the area of jurisdiction. Treaties without such flexibility, however, "would require
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process. 2 9 For example, a U.S. court may deny extradition if the
requesting state obtained the indictment by means contrary to U.S. due
process standards.3 0 Similarly, a country without a death penalty may
refuse to extradite a terrorist to the United States, if in the United States
the defendant might be subject to the death penalty.3 '
C. Extraditing Terrorists Under Multilateral Conventions
Multilateral conventions can remedy two of the primary impediments to
terrorist extradition, the problems resulting from reciprocity and the
special use of double criminality. Also, because a state cannot request
the extradition of a terrorist unless the alleged conduct constitutes a
specific violation of its criminal law, multilateral conventions overcome
problems of extraditability by requiring signatories to recognize specific
terrorist activities as criminal offenses subject to extradition.3 2 The
United States is a signatory to six multilateral antiterrorist conven-
tions.3 3 United States legislation criminalizing terrorist conduct has
largely been enacted in conjunction with U.S. accession to these
conventions .34
Multilateral conventions provide a cooperative framework between
states for terrorist extradition and prosecution, addressing three preva-
lent terrorist activities: air piracy or "hijacking"; 3 5 attacks upon diplo-
reciprocity, i.e., similarity of jurisdictional bases." Id. at ch. VII, § 2-2 (citation
omitted).
29. Id. § 2-1.
30. See id. § 2-3.
31. For example, the United States sought extradition from West Germany of
Mohammed Hamadei, a Lebanese accused of the June, 1985 hijacking of a TWA air-
liner that resulted in the death of U.S. Navy diver Robert D. Stethem. West Germany
conditioned extradition on U.S. agreement not to seek the death penalty. West Ger-
many's constitution forbids the death penalty, and all of the country's extradition
treaties allow extradition only where execution is not a possible punishment. Wash-
ington Post, Jan. 17, 1987, at A24, col. a. Although the United States acceded to this
demand, the West German government ultimately refused extradition because of
concern that extradition would endanger the lives of two West German businessmen
held in Lebanon by kidnappers seeking Hamadei's release. Washington Post, June
23, 1987, at A12, col. e.
32. No convention can solve the problem of extraditability for states which view
terrorist acts as legitimate means of pursuing political change and refuse to join the
convention.
33. See infra notes 35-37.
34. For example, to fulfill its obligations as a signatory to the International Con-
vention Against the Taking of Hostages, infra note 37, the U.S. Congress enacted the
Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2186 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. III 1985)).
35. The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [here-
inafter Tokyo Convention]; the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105
[hereinafter Hague Convention]; and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T 564, T.I.A.S.
No. 7570 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
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matic agents;3 6 and the taking of civilian hostages. 3 7 All but one of the
counter-terrorist conventions3 8 oblige signatories either to submit
offenders of these crimes to prosecution or to extradite them to another
member state wishing to prosecute. 39
Counter-terrorist conventions help states overcome the impedi-
ments to terrorist extradition that bilateral extradition treaties create.40
The conventions ensure satisfaction of substantive extradition require-
ments. To illustrate, each of the counter-terrorist conventions obliges
member states to recognize a specific form of terrorist conduct as a
criminal offense under their domestic law.4 1 Moreover, all but one of
the conventions obligate signatories to adopt legislation giving their
courts jurisdiction over the proscribed offenses. 4 2 This requirement
prevents terrorists from escaping effective prosecution if a requested
state denies extradition. 4 3 Finally, states may employ either the conven-
tion or bilateral treaties to obtain extradition.
Unfortunately, the counter-terrorist conventions also reflect the
international community's fragmented approach to proscribing terrorist
acts. Rather than providing a general framework for terrorist extradi-
tion and prosecution, each convention applies only to a specific terrorist
act. For example, while the United States can request and obtain the
extradition of a terrorist who assaults a U.S. diplomat abroad under the
New York Convention,4 4 that convention is inapplicable to extraterrito-
36. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents 2, Dec. 14, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532 [hereinafter New York Convention]; and the Organi-
zation of American States Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Tak-
ing the Forms of Crime Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of
International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413 [hereinaf-
ter O.A.S. Convention].
37. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39), U.N. Doc. A/34/39 (1979) [here-
inafter Hostages Convention].
38. The Tokyo Convention does not obligate member states to extradite alleged
offenders. Tokyo Convention, supra note 35, art. 16.
39. The counter-terrorist conventions thus incorporate the ancient maxim, aut
dedere, autjudicare, "extradite or prosecute." The obligation, however, "is not to try
the accused much less to punish him, but to submit the case to be considered for
prosecution by the appropriate national prosecuting authority. If the criminal justice
system lacks integrity, the risk of political intervention in the prosecution or at trial
exists." J. MURPHY, supra note 14, at 10 (emphasis in original).
40. With the exception of the Hostages Convention, supra note 37, the counter-
terrorist conventions discussed here have been joined by a large number of states
world-wide. Accordingly, they are an effective mechanism for states to obtain the
extradition of terrorists. For a listing of the member states to these conventions, see
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1986).
41. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
42. Of all the counter-terrorist conventions to which the United States is a party,
only the O.A.S. Convention, supra note 36, does not incorporate this requirement.
However, this convention has, for the most part, been superseded by the New York
Convention, supra note 36. J. MURPHY, supra note 14, at 11.
43. J. MURPHY, supra note 14, at 21.
44. Supra note 36.
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rial assaults on U.S. civilians.
Terrorist extradition is often more difficult to obtain for offenses
not specifically proscribed by multilateral agreements. In particular,
when a state requests extradition for an extraterritorial terrorist act
(such as assault upon or murder of U.S. civilians) the theory ofjurisdic-
tion the requesting state asserts must be acceptable to the requested
state. The following section, therefore, examines the jurisdictional the-
ories states use in proscribing extraterritorial criminal conduct, focusing
in particular upon the passive personality principle on which the Antiter-
rorism Act relies.
II. Theories of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under International Law and
Their Application to the Extradition of Terrorists
In international law, jurisdiction refers to a state's authority to prescribe
rules of conduct and its ability to enforce those rules. 45 Countries uni-
versally recognize both aspects of jurisdictional authority, rule-making
and rule-enforcing, over conduct occurring within a state's territory
"and, beyond it, such other conduct which affects its legitimate inter-
ests."' 46 While no state disputes another state's power to regulate con-
duct within its borders, theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction enjoy less
consensus. 47 Accordingly, although states must usually recognize a
requesting state's assertion of jurisdiction over offenses committed
within the requesting state's territory, they need not recognize that
authority for offenses committed outside the requesting state's territory.
This section first clarifies the relationship between jurisdiction and
extradition. It then explores the major theories of extraterritorial juris-
diction that provide alternative bases for U.S. assertion of jurisdiction
over terrorist attacks abroad. Finally, this section examines in detail the
passive personality principle, the sole basis for asserting extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the Antiterrorism Act.
A. Jurisdiction and Extradition
Extradition consists of the surrender by one country (the "requested
state") to another (the "requesting state") of an individual accused or
convicted of an offense by the requesting state.48 The requesting state
must be "competent to try and punish" the alleged offender;4 9 i.e., the
state must demonstrate a legal basis for exercising authority over the
individual.5 0 The requested state's recognition of the requesting state's
jurisdictional authority is thus "a condition precedent both to the
request and to the granting of extradition. '" 5 1
45. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at ch. VI, § I-1.
46. Id. § 1-2.
47. Id. §§ 1-3, 1-4.
48. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 526 (5th ed. 1979).
49. Id.
50. M.C. BASSIOuNI, supra note 10, at 203.
51. Id. at 204.
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Despite the significance ofjurisdiction in extradition practice, few, if
any, extradition treaties define jurisdiction. Instead they use "such terms
as within the jurisdiction of the requesting state without further clarifica-
tion." 52 Although extradition treaties do not restrict the jurisdictional
theories a state may assert over extraterritorial conduct, many treaties
preclude extradition where the requested state does not recognize the
jurisdictional theory asserted. To clarify the significance ofjurisdiction
in extradition practice, the next section describes the general theories of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and their status under international law.
B. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
In 1935, the Harvard Research in International Law ("Harvard
Research") completed a Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect
to Crime.5 3 The Harvard Research identified five general principles,
still applicable today, upon which states base criminal jurisdiction:5 4 the
territorial, the nationality, 55 the protective, the universality, and the pas-
sive personality theories of jurisdiction. Except for the territorial the-
ory, these theories support extraterritorial jurisdiction when actions
beyond state borders implicate certain state interests.
In general, the territorial theory relates to offenses committed in
whole or in part within the state's borders. An extended application of
the territorial theory, however, reaches extraterritorial conduct. This
"objective" arm of the territorial theory justifies extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion over conduct causing a harmful effect within the state.5 6 A textbook
example of the objective territorial principle occurs when the defendant
shoots a gun in Italy, injuring a person in France, who subsequently dies
52. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at ch. VI, § 1-1. Many modern extradition
treaties, however, distinguish between offenses committed within and without the
requesting state's territory. The recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction may
depend upon the offender's nationality, or on the requested state's recognition of the
jurisdictional theory asserted. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Extradition, June 20, 1978, art. 1, 32
U.S.T. 1485, 1488, T.I.A.S. No. 9785, at 4. In contrast to this general practice, the
counter-terrorist conventions explicitly define the jurisdictional bases exercisable by
member states. For example, article 5 of the Hostages Convention, supra note 37,
authorizes states to establish jurisdiction over covered offenses when acts are: com-
mitted within the state's territory; committed by or against the state's nationals; or
intended to affect state action.
53. Harvard Research in International Law,Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM.
J. Nr'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]. "United States court
decisions as well as most coursebooks and treatises on international law have
adopted the Harvard Research designations." Blakesley, supra note 25, at 687 n.7
(citations omitted).
54. Harvard Research, supra note 53, at 445.
55. Under the nationality theory the state may exercise jurisdiction over the crim-
inal acts of its nationals no matter where the offense takes place. See id. at 519-39.
56. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73J. OF CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1123 (1982). "The objective territorial principle is designed to
allow the state to take jurisdiction and to prosecute, convict and punish the perpetra-
tor of conduct which causes harm within the territory of the forum state, even though
none of the conduct occurs there." Id. at 1124-25 (emphasis in original).
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of the wound in Switzerland.5 7 In this case the harm in France (or Swit-
zerland) was caused by extraterritorial conduct (i.e., in Italy). Under the
"objective" arm of territorial theory, therefore, either France or Switzer-
land could exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.
The protective principle ofjurisdiction allows a state to assert juris-
diction over an alien (an individual or a legal entity) "acting outside the
state's territorial boundaries but in a manner which threatens significant
interests of the state." s5 8 Relevant protective interests include threats to
national security, territorial integrity, political independence, or self-
defense. 59 In general, the protective principle has broad applicability
because states can use it to assert jurisdiction over inchoate offenses
which pose a potentially damaging effect. 60
Under the universality theory, a state may assert jurisdiction based
merely on the alleged offender's presence within its territory. Unlike
other jurisdictional theories, the universality theory requires no territo-
rial, nationality, or "effects" link.6 ' Instead, the universality principle
applies to offenses considered so grave as to affect the interests of all
states, regardless of where the offender acts. 62 It grants to all states
jurisdiction to prosecute the offender. Traditionally, this principle has
been applied to piracy and the slave trade. 63
Today there is some movement to expand the number of offenses
subject to universal jurisdiction. For example, the Tentative Final Draft
of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (the "Restatement (Second) Tentative Final Draft") lists "attacks
on or hijacking of aircraft," and "perhaps terrorism" as crimes possibly
subject to universal jurisdiction under customary international law.6 4
57. See Blakesley, supra note 25, at 696-97.
58. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 10, at 259; see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981); Blakesley, supra
note 56, at 1132-49; Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State
Doctrine, 23 VA.J. OF INT'L L. 191, 209-10 (1983).
59. Paust, supra note 58, at 210. "Because of the significant dangers the protec-
tive principle poses to relations among nations, application of the theory is limited to
those recognized and stated abstractions or functions." Blakesley, supra note 56, at
1138.
60. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1968); see also
Blakesley, supra note 56, at 1137-38.
61. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 10, at 261-62.
62. Id. at 262.
63. Id. at 263, 266-67. More recently, the Nuremberg Tribunals applied the the-
ory to genocide and war crimes. Id. at 268-69. Its application has recently expanded
to crimes such as narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, and hijacking. Id. at 268.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 (Tent. Final Draft, 1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TENTATIVE FINAL
DRAFT]. Comment a to § 404 of the Restatement (Second) Tentative Final Draft,
provides: "Expanding Class of Universal Offenses .... Universal jurisdiction over the
listed offenses is established in international law as a result of universal condemna-
tion of those activities and general interest in cooperating to suppress them, as
reflected in widely-accepted international agreements and resolutions of interna-
tional organizations." Id. § 404, comment a (emphasis in original). A reporter's note
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However, a state must base its assertion of universality jurisdiction on
world-wide recognition of the offense as a "crime against mankind." 65
As the equivocal language of the Restatement suggests, most forms of
terrorism do not yet command this recognition.
The protective, universality, and objective territorial theories may
all potentially justify the assertion of jurisdiction over extraterritorial
terrorist assaults. Indeed, the majority of states recognize these theo-
ries66 and have successfully asserted them to obtain extradition of crimi-
nal offenders. In contrast, the international community has traditionally
regarded the passive personality theory, the sole basis for jurisdiction
relied on by the Antiterrorism Act,6 7 as the least favored basis for assert-
ing extraterritorial jurisdiction. Because a state "cannot properly pre-
scribe activity or exercise jurisdiction unless it is pursuant to an
'accepted' basis of jurisdiction," 68 this Note will examine the develop-
ment and status of the passive personality theory of jurisdiction.
C. Evolution of the Passive Personality Principle
1. International Law
The leading decision on state authority to regulate extraterritorial con-
duct affecting its nationals is the S.S. Lotus case. 69 In 1926, a French and
a Turkish steamer collided on the high seas, resulting in the death of
eight Turkish nationals aboard the Turkish ship. 70 Despite protests
from France, Turkey seized the captain of the French steamer upon his
arrival in Constantinople. 7 1 A Turkish court subsequently tried and
convicted the captain of manslaughter 72 under a provision of the Turk-
ish Criminal Code permitting the exercise of passive personality juris-
diction. 73 With the acquiescence of Turkey, France appealed the
in the Restatement (Second) Tentative Final Draft states thiat the First Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law listed piracy as the only offense subject to undisputed univer-
sal jurisdiction. Id. § 404, reporter's note 3. The First Restatement "listed other
crimes of universal interest but deemed them not yet subject to universal jurisdiction
as a matter of international law." Id.
65. See M.C. BAssIouNI, supra note 14, at ch. VI, § 6-1.
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TENTATIVE FINAL DRAFr, supra note 64, § 402 com-
ments (a)-(f.
67. Title XII of the Antiterrorism Act uses the passive personality principle to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction because it prohibits foreign terrorist assaults when
the victim is a U.S. national. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (West Supp. 1987).
68. Blakesley, supra note 56, at 1157.
69. The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 11.
73. The Turkish Penal Code provided:
Any foreigner who... commits an offense abroad to the prejudice of Turkey
or of a Turkish subject, for which offense Turkish law prescribes a penalty
involving loss of freedom for a minimum period of not less than one year,
shall be punished in accordance with the Turkish Penal Code provided he is
arrested in Turkey.
Turkish Penal Code, art. 6, Law No. 765 of March 1, 1926, quoted in The S.S. Lotus
(France v. Turkey) 1927 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 14-15 (Sept. 7).
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conviction to the Permanent Court of International Justice.74 The
Court upheld Turkey's right to prosecute the French national7 5 based
on a combination of two theories ofjurisdiction: the passive personality
and the "floating territorial" theories. 7 6 All six dissenting judges, 77
however, declared that international law did not permit the exercise of
jurisdiction based solely on the victim's nationality. 78
Eight years later, the influential Harvard Research Draft Conven-
tion79 categorized the passive personality principle as an insufficient
basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law. The Con-
vention termed the passive personality theory the most strongly con-
tested and "most difficult to justify in theory" of all the principles of
jurisdiction.8 0 International legal scholars have similarly disparaged the
passive personality theory.8 ' In fact, some commentators challenged
the passive personality principle's inclusion in the early counter-terrorist
conventions, asserting that the principle went beyond generally
accepted principles of customary international law.8 2
The Restatement (Second) Tentative Final Draft, however, notes an
increasing acceptance of the theory.8 3 Israel and France, for example,
have recently recognized the passive personality principle,8 4 and the
74. The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 11 (Sept.
7).
75. Id. at 32.
76. Id. at 22-27. The floating territorial theory of jurisdiction, a subset of the
territorial principle, regards a ship as an extension of the territory of the state in
which it is registered. Thus, the Permanent Court of International Justice considered
the French steamer's collision into the Turkish ship as having caused an effect in
Turkish territory.
77. Twelve judges sat on the Lotus court. In the event of a tie, the President's
vote became decisive.
78. The S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 34-107; see also W. BISHOP,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 548 (3d ed. 1971).
79. See supra note 53.
80. W. BISHOP, supra note 78, at 579. Harvard Research concluded that otherjurisdictional theories, particularly the universality principle, could serve all the inter-
ests for which the passive personality might be asserted. Id.
81. See, e.g.,J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 234 (1955); see also M.C. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 14, at ch. VI, § 4-2.
82. See Murphy, Protected Persons and Diplomatic Facilities, in LEGAL AsPEcTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 277, 307 (A. Evans & J. Murphy eds. 1978); see also
DeSchutter, Problems ofJurisdiction in the International Control and Repression of Terrorism,
in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 377, 383 (M.C. Bassiouni ed.
1975). But see Blakesley, supra note 25, at 717 n.99 ("Certainly, given the wide accept-
ance of this principle ... it would be difficult to say that international law bars a
broad application of it."). Moreover, the adoption of the passive personality princi-
ple by subsequent conventions may render moot the argument that it is not a gener-
ally accepted principle of international law.
83. The Restatement provides: "While the principle has not been generally
accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, it has been increasingly accepted when applied
to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their
nationality, or to assassinations of a state's ambassadors or government officials."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TENTATIVE FINAL DRAFT, supra note 64, § 402, comment g.
84. Israel adopted the passive personality principle into its penal code on March
21, 1972. Penal Law Amendment (Offenses Committed Abroad) (Amendment No.
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criminal codes of several other civil law countries use the principle to
cover a broad range of conduct.8 5 The principle has especially gained
recognition in the context of terrorism. Presently, three counter-terror-
ist conventions recognize the passive personality principle.8 6 In particu-
lar, sixty-eight parties to the New York Convention8 7 explicitly accept
the principle's legitimacy for asserting jurisdiction over terrorist attacks
upon diplomats. 88
Despite the passive personality principle's growing international
acceptance, the number of nations that would honor its assertion over
other forms of terrorism is impossible to determine. No one has com-
prehensively studied the passive personality principle since the 1935
Harvard Research Draft Convention. Commentators stress that states
cannot rely on it as an exclusive basis ofjurisdiction.8 9 When an addi-
tional basis exists, however, the passive personality principle may serve
to reinforce the claim of jurisdiction.90
2. United States Law
The United States, like much of the international community, has also
rejected the passive personality theory in its law and practice. In the
Cutting case, 91 Mexico tried and convicted an American national for
allegedly publishing a libelous account of a Mexican citizen in a Texas
newspaper. In a protest letter to the U.S. charge d'affairs in Mexico,
Secretary of State Bayard articulated the traditional U.S. position on the
passive personality principle:
[I]t has consistently been laid down in the United States as a rule of
action that citizens of the United States cannot be held answerable in for-
eign countries for offenses that were wholly committed and consummated
either in their own country or in other countries not subject to the juris-
diction of the punishing state.9 2
In the most recent case affirming the traditional U.S. position, the
United States denied a West German request to extradite several aliens
4) Law, 5732-1972. France adopted the principle by promulgating article 689 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure onJuly 11, 1975. France adopted the passive personal-
ity principle primarily to punish the perpetrators of crimes against French citizens
when the country in which the crime was committed failed to prosecute. Blakesley,
supra note 25, at 714-15.
85. In addition to France and Israel, see supra note 84, West Germany, Italy, Swe-
den, China, and Mexico permit the exercise of passive personality jurisdiction.
86. See Tokyo Convention, supra note 35, art. 4; New York Convention, supra note
36, art. 3; Hostages Convention, supra note 37, art. 5.
87. Supra note 36.
88. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 40, at 304.
89. See, e.g., M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at ch. VI, § 4-6.
90. Id. Bassiouni points out that, all else being equal, in cases of conflict between
two states, the state claiming passive personality as an additional basis receives prior-
ity. Id.
91. Cutting case, 1887 For. Rel. 751 (1888), reported in 2 J.B. MOORE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw DIGEST 232-40 (1906).
92. Id. at 753-57, 2 J.B. MOORE at 228-32.
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for allegedly murdering four German officers on the high seas.9 3 West
Germany employed a provision of its penal code authorizing passive
personality jurisdiction;9 4 the United States, however, denied extradi-
tion by applying the "special use" of the double criminality condition. 9 5
Although the United States and West Germany both recognized murder
as an extraditable offense, U.S. law disallowed the assertion of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction based on the passive personality theory. 96 This
divergence of jurisdictional recognition precluded extradition. The
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
embodied the American position at that time: "A state does not have
the jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching a legal consequence
to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the
conduct affects one of its nationals." 9 7
The United States' traditional broad-based rejection of the passive
personality principle conflicts with its recent adoption of that principle
in joining counter-terrorist conventions and enacting implementing leg-
islation. 98 Nevertheless, application of the passive personality principle
to extraterritorial offenses appears to satisfy U.S. constitutional stan-
dards.99 The policy of the United States, though unarticulated, is to rec-
ognize passive personality jurisdiction when applied to terrorist acts, but
not for other criminal conduct. The passive personality theory thus
holds a similar status under both U.S. and customary international law:
it is insufficient as an independent basis for jurisdiction, except where a
multilateral convention, and its implementing legislation, adopts the
principle.
Given the United States' determination to act against terrorist
attacks abroad, the logical question is whether other jurisdictional theo-
ries could replace or reinforce use of the passive personality theory in
the Antiterrorism Act. After discussing the Act, the following section
93. MS DEP'T OF STATE, file no. P75 9175-0032 (1975), reported in Blakesley, supra
note 25, at 748-49.
94. German Penal Code art. 4(2) (1974).
95. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
96. Although the victims were military representatives of the requesting state, the
United States would most likely reach the same result today. Although West Ger-
many and the United States are both signatories to the New York Convention, supra
note 36, the convention does not include military personnel as "protected persons."
Moreover, the United States' current practice of recognizing passive personality
jurisdiction in the context of terrorism does not necessarily alter the traditional U.S.
rejection of the theory for "non-terrorist" crimes.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 30(2) (1965).
98. In addition to the Antiterrorism Act, the Act for the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Hostage Taking, which implements U.S. obligations under the
Hostages Convention, supra note 37, also recognizes passive personality jurisdiction
over terrorist conduct abroad, e.g., kidnapping. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. III 1985);
see also infra note 103.
99. See Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omni-
bus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 620 (1987).
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examines the inherent problems of extraditing terrorists who assault
U.S. nationals abroad.
m. Obstacles to the Successful Extradition of Terrorists under the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986
The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorist Act of 1986100 aims
to enhance the security of U.S. government personnel' 01 and civilians
from terrorist activity abroad. Specifically, Title XII of the Act creates
extraterritorial authority to prosecute and punish terrorists who cause
serious bodily injury to, or the death of, a U.S. national. 10 2 The Act fills
a gap in U.S. law by extending the existing federal prohibition against
extraterritorial assault upon U.S. officials to any U.S. national abroad. '
03
Although the Act contains no special extradition provision,' 0 4 extradi-
tion is clearly essential to the Act's utility. 15
The Antiterrorism Act looks exclusively to the victim's nationality as
a basis for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.' 0 6 Title XII neither
refers to nor supports any other theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
such as jurisdiction based on "harmful effects" within the United States
(the objective territorial theory), or based on national security or self-
defense (the protective principle). While terrorists may be prosecuted
100. Supra note 2.
101. See id.
102. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2331(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1987).
103. See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R.
REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1926, 1960. 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (1982) prohibits extraterritorial murder
or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected per-
sons. Congress enacted this provision to implement U.S. obligations under the New
York and O.A.S. Conventions, supra note 36. United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp.
212, 222 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972
(1981).
104. However, section 1201(c)(2) of the Antiterrorism Act, supra note 2, calls on
the President to encourage negotiation of an international convention to prevent and
control all aspects of international terrorism. The Section expresses the "sense of
Congress" that such a convention contain, inter alia, uniform extradition rules for
terrorists.
105. Sen. Arlen Specter, the sponsor of the original measure finally enacted as
Title XII, strongly advocates using force, if necessary, to bring alleged terrorists into
custody when extradition is impractical or impossible. See 131 CONG. REC. S8960-61
(daily ed. June 27, 1985) (statement of Sen. Specter); see also Hearing on Bills to Author-
ize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S. Government Employees and Citizens
Abroad Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-42 (1985) (statement of Sen. Specter) [hereinafter Hearing].
However, even Sen. Specter acknowledges that using such tactics is extreme and
ordinarily unnecessary. Id. at 33.
106. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(a) (West Supp. 1987) provides: "Whoever kills a national
of the United States, while such national is outside the United States, shall [be subject to
severe penalties]." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, section 233 1(b) prescribes pen-
alties for "[w]hoever outside the United States attempts to kill, or engages in a con-
spiracy to kill, a national of the United States." Id. § 2331(b) (emphasis added). Finally,
section 2331 (c) provides penalties for extraterritorial assaults intended to or causing
serious bodily injury to U.S. nationals. Id. § 2331(c) (emphasis added).
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merely if present within the United States (i.e., according to the univer-
sality principle), the definition of the substantive offense is predicated
on the victim's U.S. nationality. Thus, for the purposes of extradition,
the passive personality principle represents the sole legal basis for the
United States to assert jurisdiction over Title XII offenders.
Senator Arlen Specter introduced three bills in 1985 proposing
criminalization of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens abroad. 10 7
Although these bills varied in the specific crimes proscribed and the vic-
tims protected, they shared a common purpose with Title XII as
enacted-deterring terrorist acts against U.S. citizens by threatening
federal prosecution whenever personal jurisdiction can be obtained.10 8
Unlike Title XII, these proposals did not depend solely on the pas-
sive personality principle for jurisdiction. By permitting jurisdiction
whenever the alleged offender is found within U.S. borders, "irrespec-
tive of the place where the offense was committed or the nationality of
the victim or the alleged offender,"' 1 9 the bills made use of the univer-
sality principle. Because the bills also employed the passive personality
principle,'110 they would, despite some internal inconsistencies, 1 have
supported a request for extradition based either on the universality or
passive personality theories ofjurisdiction.
Congress likely intended to base Title XII jurisdiction upon a com-
bination of the passive personality and protective principles. When Sen.
Specter, the bill's sponsor, introduced the legislation into Congress, he
stated that the United States was justified in exercising jurisdiction over
terrorists attacking U.S. citizens abroad because of the adverse effect of
these attacks upon U.S. security and upon the operation of governmen-
tal functions."12 Sen. Specter also stated that it would be appropriate
for the United States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over any
terrorist act directed against a U.S. citizen anywhere in the world. "3 As
enacted, however, Title XII asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction on the
107. S. 1373, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) ("Protection of United States Govern-
ment Personnel Act of 1985"); S. 1429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) ("Terrorist
Prosecution Act of 1985"); and S. 1508, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) ("Terrorist
Death Penalty Act of 1985").
108. Hearing, supra note 105 at 22 (letter of Raymond J. Celada, American Law
Division, Congressional Research Service, July 26, 1985).
109. S. 1373, supra note 107, § 2; S. 1429, supra note 107, § 2.
110. S. 1429, supra note 107, § 2, defined the substantive offenses as murder or
assault against a U.S. national, while S. 1373, supra note 107, § 2, defined these
crimes as offenses against U.S. citizens.
S111. The bills are internally inconsistent because they define the substantive
offense as an act against a U.S. citizen or national, yet permit the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion irrespective of the victim's nationality. Further, although S. 1373 intends to
authorize prosecution of terrorists who attack U.S. government employees, the bill's
text proscribes attacks against any citizen of the United States. S. 1373, supra note 107,
§ 2(a).
112. Hearing, supra note 105, at 36. Clearly, Sen. Specter was referring to the pro-
tective theory ofjurisdiction.
113. Id. at 41 (statement of Sen. Specter).
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passive personality theory alone. 1 14 In enacting this legislation, Con-
gress apparently failed to consider the passive personality principle's
questionable status under international law.
Title XII's primary usefulness is to criminalize extraterritorial ter-
rorist assaults against civilians, thereby empowering U.S. authorities to
request the extradition of offenders. To ensure that the statute is
applied only to terrorist acts and not to "ordinary" violent crimes
against U.S. citizens abroad, the Act requires the Attorney General to
certify that the offense "was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate
against a government or a civilian population."" 15
The Antiterrorism Act is a unilateral response to a particular form
of terrorism. Unlike a bilateral extradition treaty or multilateral conven-
tion, domestic legislation like the Antiterrorism Act cannot bind foreign
states. In this context, barriers to extradition such as the double crimi-
nality condition, its "special use," and the political offense exception," 16
may individually or collectively act to bar the extradition of Title XII
offenders.
If the predicate offense of the Antiterrorism Act, a terrorist assault
upon foreign nationals, is not a crime in the requested state (where, for
example, such conduct might be considered a legitimate "political act"),
the U.S. request will fail the double criminality requirement, resulting in
a denial of extradition. 1 7 Therefore, although the Antiterrorism Act
authorizes U.S. extradition requests, foreign states have no obligation to
recognize the criminality of extraterritorial terrorist assaults as within
the jurisdiction of the United States.
Similarly, the "special use" of the double criminality require-
ment s 18 will bar extradition where the requested state does not recog-
nize the passive personality theory, the only basis for the Antiterrorism
Act's assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In many cases, one or
114. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
115. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(e) (West Supp. 1987).
116. Most extradition treaties and conventions include the political offense excep-
tion, which most commentators consider to be an established exception to extradi-
tion obligations under customary international law. See Bassiouni, The Political Offense
Exception in Extradition Law and Practice, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL
CRIMES, supra note 82, at 399.
Exploration of the political offense exception is beyond the scope of this Note. For
a discussion of the problems this exception poses for combatting international ter-
rorism, see Lubet, Extradition Reform: Executive Discretion andJudicial Participation in the
Extradition of Political Terrorists, 15 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 247 (1982); Friedlander, Terror-
ism and International Law: Recent Developments, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 493, 499-505 (1982);
Gilbert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q.
695 (1985); Vogler, Perspectives on Extradition and Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERROR-
ISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES, supra note 82, at 391-97.
117. Most current U.S. extradition treaties require denial of extradition absent sat-
isfaction of the double criminality requirement. See Blakesley, supra note 25, at 743.
The Swedish-American extradition treaty is an exception, allowing discretion in
interpreting this requirement. See Extradition Treaty, Oct. 24, 1961, United States-
Sweden, art. 1, 14 U.S.T. 1845, 1846, T.1.A.S. No. 5496, at 2.
118. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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both of the double criminality requirements will prevent extradition of
Title XII offenders. For extradition to succeed, two conditions must be
satisfied: the requested state must recognize the act as criminal, and it
must recognize the jurisdictional theory asserted by the requesting
state. 19 In sum, the lack of international consensus on the passive per-
sonality principle's legitimacy will hinder or prevent the extradition of
terrorists to the United States.
IV. Recommendations for Improving the Claim of Jurisdiction over
Foreign Terrorist Acts
Absent uniform international recognition of the passive personality the-
ory, the United States, in many cases, has no legal authority for insisting
on the extradition of Title XII offenders. Although passive personality
jurisdiction may enjoy wide acceptance in the context of terrorism, 120
the United States cannot rely on it exclusively to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Congress could greatly increase the likely success of extra-
diting Title XII offenders by redrafting the Act to include additional
jurisdictional grounds.
Congress may have intended to limit the scope of the statute to ter-
rorist assaults affecting U.S. nationals, but it need not have omitted lan-
guage supporting extradition requests based on other jurisdictional
theories. Moreover, there is no indication that Congress, when enacting
Title XII, was aware of possible difficulties in extraditing offenders
under the passive personality principle.1 2 1
To remedy these problems, Congress should amend the Antiterror-
ism Act to incorporate any one, or a combination, of the protective,
objective territorial, or universality theories ofjurisdiction. Many states
that may be reluctant to extradite under the passive personality theory
alone will probably comply with a U.S. request if Congress incorporates
into the Act one or more additional, more widely accepted, sources of
jurisdiction.
The Antiterrorism Act could easily incorporate the protective the-
ory ofjurisdiction by including language reflecting the threat to national
security posed by foreign terrorist attacks upon U.S. nationals.' 2 2 Cer-
tainly, a terrorist attack directed against U.S. nationals to coerce state
action may threaten state security, sovereignty, or government func-
119. See Blakesley, supra note 25, at 739, where the author applies these require-
ments to the enforcement of U.S. laws prohibiting extraterritorial narcotics conspira-
cies and other "economic" crimes.
120. As the counter-terrorist conventions demonstrate, the passive personality
theory may yet become an accepted basis for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, particularly in the arena of international terrorism. One explanation for this
development is that victims of terrorism are often intentionally targeted for attack
because of their nationality. The assertion of passive personality jurisdiction is the
logical means for states to protect their nationals from the threat of such attack. See
supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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tions. Similarly, when foreign terrorist attacks against Americans pro-
duce harmful effects within the United States, the United States could
assert jurisdiction according to the objective territorial theory. 123 As
currently drafted, however, the Antiterrorism Act fails to provide
authority for the assertion ofjurisdiction under either theory.
The United States might also assert jurisdiction over foreign terror-
ist assaults under the universality principle. Although this assertion
would be less certain of acceptance, the Restatement (Second) Tentative
Final Draft indicates that terrorism may warrant recognition as a crime
subject to universal jurisdiction. 124 The Restatement and U.S. courts
have introduced the notion "that jurisdiction may be asserted over cases
of at least serious and nearly universally condemned extraterritorial...
offenses as long as the offense was intended to have 'substantial effect'
on the territory of the United States, and as long as the assertion of
jurisdiction is reasonable."' 125 This theory appears to combine the
universality and objective territorial theories of jurisdiction. Arguably,
the Antiterrorism Act extends jurisdiction over offenses intended to
have substantial effect in the United States, supporting the assertion of
this hybrid theory of jurisdiction.
Given the traditional disparagement of the passive personality the-
ory under international law, the United States is inviting failure in future
requests for the extradition of offenders by asserting jurisdiction on this
theory alone. While jurisdiction based directly on injury to a U.S.
national abroad intuitively provides more concrete authority than the
less tangible "harmful effects" theory or a threat to national security, the
objective territorial and protective principles currently enjoy greater
recognition under international law. 12 6 Title XII could retain the
requirement of an injury to U.S. nationals, but it should include lan-
guage to support these alternative theories of jurisdiction.
V. Conclusion
Title XII of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986 establishes U.S. criminal jurisdiction over terrorist assaults upon
U.S. nationals abroad. The statutory language, however, permits asser-
tion ofjurisdiction solely on the basis of the passive personality princi-
ple, the least accepted theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Despite
growing international acceptance of the passive personality theory, the
Antiterrorism Act as enacted probably will not succeed in obtaining the
extradition and prosecution of terrorists who attack U.S. nationals
abroad. The United States could more effectively bring terrorists tojus-
123. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TENTATIVE FINAL DRAFT, supra note 64, § 404.
125. Blakesley, supra note 56, at 1160-61.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TENTATIVE FINAL DRAF, supra note 64, § 402 com-
ments (a)-(c).
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tice by redrafting the Antiterrorist Act to include additional theoretical
grounds for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.
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